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Abstract
The paper discusses concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘life’ as subjected to historical changes. The 21st
century seems to be obsessed with ‘life’ and ‘nature’, which are reconfigured as objects of simulation
practices and of a multitude of technoscientific enterprises as well as of political struggle. The
historical influences and epistemological shifts of systems thinking are significant within two
distinctive and interwoven fields: On the one hand the discourse of environmentalism with the
paradigm of ecological crises, centered around ideas of resource management, sustainability, the
general idea of an ‘endangered nature’ and the interconnectedness of global politics and individual
actions. On the other hand the optimistic promises of artificial life, with synthetic biology and digital
cyborg technologies as its avantgarde, which are very much driven by the idea of technoscientific
mastery to surpass natures ‘weakness’ and by desires to improve ‘life’ and to even refashion ‘life
itself’.
On the field of historical ecology, concepts of systems thinking are traced back to the middle of the
19th century, where ecological thought emerged at the intersections of biology and geography.
Meandering between vitalistic, holistic, and mechanistic concepts, between living and non-living
elements, systems ecology finally substitutes ‘nature’, which in turn is re-established in its new
‘gestalt’ as computer simulated world model since the early 1970s. Resurrected as an interrelation of
system variables at the level of global simulations ‘nature’ strikes as a zombie.
As a second turning point of the rewriting of the matrix, of life we will discuss the advance of
‘games’ since the early 1970ies, with the example of ‘Game of life’ (‘Life’) as a significant landmark.
When ‘life’ becomes ‘Life’, it is by computerized modeling in terms of dynamic processes. Computer
games can be thought of as instances of the popularization of cybernetic system thinking, functioning
as interdiscoursive fragments between the specialized discourse of system theories and the sphere of
‘common sense’ (Nohr 2008), where the specific “gaming situation” (Eskelinen 2001) foregrounds
playful individual action and manipulation of system objects within a set of given rules or the
manipulation of system rules itself on the level of the ‘code’.
We will argue that both, the ecological discourse and the algorithmic model of self-reproduction of
‘Life’, are historically and systematically related manifestations and mediations of system theory.
While they can be regarded as referring to different scales of application (macro-economic reasoning
in the case of global eco-systems, modeling of bottom-up-complexity on a micro-level in the case of
‘Life’) and belonging to distinctive disciplines (economic and ecological research vs. mathematical
theory of automata and artificial life studies), they share some common ground in being “algorithmic
media” (Marks 2014) that are functional as “rhetorical software” (Doyle 1997) and as “allegorithms”
(Galloway 2006) of the new compositions of the techno-biological and techno-ecological situation of
the 21st century.
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 Introduction 
One of the characteristic features of systems thinking can be seen in its unifying 
approach, where organisms and technological artifacts, ecological relations and 
man-made infrastructures shall all be described with a common set of concepts. 
As a consequence, systems thinking can destabilize traditional western ontologies, 
even those that seemed to have essential value for ethical and political orientation: 
The very concepts of ‘Nature’ and ‘Life’ itself are rewritten by the historical 
influences and epistemological shifts of systems theory.  
This becomes especially significant within two distinctive yet interwoven 
fields of knowledge: environmentalism and artificial life. As the discourse of 
‘global warming’ illustrates, the impact of systems thinking is not limited to 
scientific research but on the contrary popularized on a global scale. To 
understand the historical interconnection of systems thinking with the rise of the 
ecological paradigm, it is important to see how central elements of systems 
thinking can be traced back to the emerging ideas of ecological thought in the 
latter half of the 19th century, and how this thought assumes its current shape 
under the influence of the media technology of the computer in 20th century. 
The concepts of ‘Nature’ and ‘Life’ are thus fundamentally irritated by the 
inclusion of the artificial. In particular, the understanding of natural processes and 
qualities as well as the concept of ‘life itself’ become dislocated under the 
influence of systems thinking combined with computer technologies of modelling, 
simulation, and manipulation. Furthermore, as we will discuss later with the 
prominent example of ‘Game of Life’, it can be argued that the rise of ‘games’ as 
part of computer culture since the early 1970s is a significant landmark for the 
popularization of systems thinking as well as for the transformation of concepts of 
‘life itself’. 
 
Risk and Closure 
Starting with ‘Nature’, the globalized geopolitical, economic, and ecological 
crises of the 20th century make evident that space as well as time for humankind 
as a biological species might be limited. Within geology, the ecological effects of 
this historical development have led to the assumption of an epochal shift from 
the holocene to the “anthropocene”.1 The holocene, which had provided the 
climatic conditions for the development of stable cultures and civilizations, is 
assumed to be superseded by the anthropocene, as indicated by a significant 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Paul J. Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” Nature, 415 (3. Jan. 2002): 23; Jan 
Zalasiewicz et al., “Are We Now Living in the Anthropocene?” GSA Today, 18.2 
(2008): 4–8. 
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 increase of CO2 found in air entrapments of the arctic ice since the end of the 18th 
century. Since then, population growth and industrialization with increasing 
consumption of fossil energies and other natural resources lead to the situation 
that human behavior engenders significant changes within the biosphere. For the 
first time, man made history and natural history converge in a paradox way, only 
to confirm the long standing tradition of theories that assume a circular causality 
between anthropological and geophysical processes, ranging from ancient 
cosmogonies over the romantic concept of ‘Weltseele’ and Hegel’s ‘Weltgeist’ to 
Vernadsky’s ‘noosphere’ or Teilhard de Chardin’s ‘omega point’, also including 
versions of Gaia theory that have become influential for ecologic thinking. It is 
thus not by coincidence that ecology is close to spiritual affairs. 
The anthropocentric perspective seems the more inevitable as in the 
context of globalization, ecological damages amount to a self-impairment of 
world society. At present, ecological hazards tend to become universal and 
irreversible, and are moreover supposed to yield boomerang effects, sooner or 
later turning back on their originators on a global scale. In this context, Ulrich 
Beck has developed the concept of “world risk society,” where global conflicts 
get more and more centred on the distribution of risks rather than the distribution 
of resources.2 According to the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, the concept 
of risk has to be distinguished not from the notion of safety, but from the concept 
of endangerment: External dangers are not caused by the affected person or 
institution but are attributed to an intransparent environment; the notion of risk, 
on the other hand, links an undesirable situation to some previous decision, which 
could have been made otherwise.3 Contingencies are thus transformed into 
potential consequences of conscious behavior, so that occurrences such as 
hurricanes or floods might become symptoms of anthropogenic climate change. 
Mediated by the concept of global risk, the most influential Aristotelian 
distinction between physis (following internal goals) on the one hand and téchne 
(following human purposes) on the other – which lay at the heart of the distinction 
between nature and culture – in effect collapses. In the anthropocene driven by a 
world risk society, human decision making and control gain vital importance on a 
global scale, while nature as an independent causal force and element in its own 
right paradoxically disappears. Essentially the same diagnosis is attained with 
respect to technoscientific endeavours such as genetic engineering and synthetic 
biology, where the distinction between natural and artificial objects is also 
increasingly blurred. Thus on the macro level of ecological risk as well as on the 
micro level of bio-technological mastery, “life itself” becomes a technological 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Ulrich Beck, Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Sicherheit 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2008). 
3
 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2003), 30f. 
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 enterprise. Media theorist Marshall McLuhan links this modern condition of 
ecology to the historical moment of space exploration: 
Perhaps the largest conceivable revolution in information occurred 
on October 17, 1957, when Sputnik created a new environment for 
the planet. For the first time the natural world was completely 
enclosed in a man-made container. At the moment that the earth 
went inside this new artifact, Nature ended and Ecology was born. 
‘Ecological’ thinking became inevitable as soon as the planet 
moved up into the status of a work of art.4 
In this passage, McLuhan draws on a topological inversion: man is no longer 
surrounded by nature, which is instead encircled by human technology. The 
exclusion of nature from society turns into its complete technical inclusion or 
enclosure, as it were, in an artificial container that is represented both by the 
Sputnik’s shape and by its orbit. In terms of this picture, the era of ecology ends 
that of nature, and ecology is a matter of technology and art. Alluding to 
Shakespeare as well as military terminology, the globe becomes a theatre which 
allows no external perspective. That there are no spectators but only actors, as the 
title of McLuhan’s text suggests, again points to the central notion of closure: 
There is no outside of society resp. technology. 
Not by coincidence, the Sputnik also is a symbol of cold war; the 
notorious ‘shock’ that supposedly accompanied its appearance for the Western 
World in the context of technology and arms race is associated with a historical 
situation characterized by strict external boundaries (Iron Curtain) and internal 
paranoia (Manchurian Candidate) of political blocks, a climate which was surely 
inspiring for cybernetic systems thinking with its fascination by operational 
closure and autopoiesis. 
 
Ecology: Life in space and time 
While McLuhan surely provides a clear sighted definition of modern systems 
thinking, the latter’s historical roots can be traced back to ecological ideas 
emerging within geography and biology in the second half of the 19th century. In 
the following sections, we shall highlight some important concepts and 
developments in this complex discoursive field which are related to our argument 
– without claiming to provide a thorough or complete history of ecology, of 
course. Central for ecological thought is the assumption that organisms enter into 
                                                 
4
 Marshall McLuhan, “At the moment of Sputnik the planet became a global theater in 
which there are no spectators but only actors,” Journal of Communication, 24.1 (1974): 
48–58, 49. Actually, Sputnik I was launched on October 4, 1957. 
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 functional relations to their surroundings und thus cannot be studied in isolation, 
an idea which is constitutive for the first definition of ecology given by the 
German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) in 1866.5 Inspired by Darwin’s 
theories of descendence and natural selection, Haeckel develops a strictly 
mechanist theory, according to which the morphology of organisms and the 
development of species are completely determined by environmental factors he 
calls conditions of existence (“Existenz-Bedingungen”), encompassing inorganic 
factors such as soil and climate as well as organic factors which are mainly given 
by the surrounding organisms. 
Ecological considerations like these allow a fundamental shift of focus 
from the evolutionary relation between individual organisms and species under 
the determining influence of their milieus towards collective forms of life in a 
given spatial environment. In the context on his work on Frisian oyster banks, the 
German zoologist Karl August Möbius (1825-1908) introduces the concept of 
biocoenosis (“Lebensgemeinde”), which foregrounds the complex interactions 
and interdependencies of co-existing individuals and species.6 In his seminal 
paper “The Lake as a Microcosm” Stephen A. Forbes uses the notion of 
‘community of interest’ as a central point of ecological reference.7 Corresponding 
assumptions are found in the context of botany and plant geography. The first and 
most influencing text book on ecology published by the Danish botanist Eugen 
Warming (1841-1924) draws on the notion of ‘plant community’. Warming’s 
“Plantesamfund. Grundtræk af den økologiske Plantegeografi” (1895) is 
translated to German in 1896 and to English in 1909 (“Ecology of Plants. An 
Introduction to the Study of Plant-Communities”). The German limnologist 
August Thienemann postulates an organic unity between biocoenosis and biotope 
(“Lebensraum, Milieu”) in 1916.8 
                                                 
5
 Ernst Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen. Allgemeine Grundzüge der 
organischen Formen-Wissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles 
Darwin reformirte Descendenz-Theorie, Bd. 2: Allgemeine Entwickelungsgeschichte 
der Organismen. Kritische Grundzüge der mechanischen Wissenschaft von den 
entstehenden Formen der Organismen, begründet durch die Descendenz-Theorie 
(Berlin: Reimer, 1866), 286ff. 
6
 Karl August Möbius, Die Auster und die Austernwirthschaft (Berlin: Wiegandt, 
Hempel & Parey, 1877). 
7
 Stephen A. Forbes, “The Lake as a Microcosm,” Bull. of the Scientific Association 
(Peoria, IL), (1887): 77–87. 
8
 Cf. Kurt Jax, “Holocoen and Ecosystem – On the Origin and Historical Consequences 
of Two Concepts,” Journal of the History of Biology, 31 (1998): 113–142.  
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 At the beginning of the 20th century, the shift from classical autecological 
to synecological approaches9 combines with philosophical ideas of holism and 
organicism, which is reflected by such concepts as the “holocoen” developed by 
the entomologist Karl Friederichs (1878-1969), or the ecological gestalt-systems 
(“ökologische Gestalt-Systeme”) of Richard Woltereck (1877-1944).10 Drawing 
on Frederic E. Clements’ (1874-1945) work on the evolutionary succession of 
plant communities,11 the South African ecologist John Phillips promotes the 
concepts of “complex organisms” resp. super-organisms,12 combining views of 
Clements with the theory of holism popularized by the South African statesman, 
general and philosopher Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950).13 
The central holistic assumption of the priority of some (physical, 
biological, or social) ‘whole’ over its ‘parts’ is reflected not only in ecological 
theories of super-organisms from animal and plant collectives to some versions of 
the Gaia theory developed by James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis in the 1960s 
and 1970s.14 Holistic and vitalist thought also prepare the ground for what might 
be called proto-constructivist theories of the relation between organisms and their 
environments. In particular, the determining influence of the milieu originally 
suggested by Haeckel is called into question. In Haeckel’s mechanistic 
framework, the morphology and dynamics of life are supposed to be completely 
reducible to causas efficientes of the physical world imposed on some organism. 
Contrary to this claim, the Scottish physiologist John S. Haldane (1860-1936) in 
                                                 
9
 The terms “Autökologie“ and “Synökologie“ were introduced around 1900 by Carl 
Schröter, see Carl Schröter and Oskar von Kirchner, Die Vegetation des Bodensees, 
Vol. 2, (Lindau: Verein für Geschichte des Bodensees und seiner Umgebung, 1902). 
10
 Cf. Jax, “Holocoen and Ecosystem.” 
11
 Frederic E. Clements, Plant Succession. An Analysis of the Development of Vegetation 
(Washington 1916); Frederic E. Clements, “Nature and Structure of the Climax,” 
Journal of Ecology, 24 (1936): 252–284. 
12
 John Phillips, “Succession, Development, the Climax, and the Complex Organism: An 
Analysis of Concepts. Parts I-III,” Journal of Ecology, 22.2 (1934): 554–571; 23.1 
(1935): 210–246; 23.2 (1935): 488–508. 
13
 On the historical relations of ecological thought to imperialism and colonialism, see 
Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology. Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 
(Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2001). On the affinities of the 
German holistic tradition around Thienemann and Friederichs to geopolitics and even 
fascistic ideologies of blood and soil, see Benjamin Bühler, “Zukunftsbezug und 
soziale Ordnung im Diskurs der politischen Ökologie,“ Zeitschrift für 
Kulturwissenschaften, 2009/2: 35–44, 38f. 
14
 Cf. Bruce Clarke, “Neocybernetics of Gaia: The Emergence of Second-Order Gaia 
Theory,“ In Gaia in Turmoil: Climate Change, Biodepletion, and Earth Ethics in an 
Age of Crisis, edited by Eileen Crist and H. Bruce Rinker (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2009), 293–314. 
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 an early paper from 1884 points to the purpose driven and goal oriented behavior 
of living beings and argues that the causal link between the organism and its 
environment has to be thought of in terms of a reciprocal instead of a one way 
relation.15 Similar considerations lead the Baltic zoologist Jakob Johann von 
Uexküll to the assumption that the environment is not simply given as an 
objective milieu at all, but rather construed by each organism in accordance with 
its perceptive and motor faculties. Thus the worlds of a cow, a tick, and a black 
bird differ substantially, although these animals might be found in spatial vicinity. 
In order to account for these differences, Uexküll draws a systematic distinction 
between the terms “Umwelt” (environmental world), which is a essentially the 
projection of an organism’s construction plan (“Bauplan”), and “Außenwelt” 
(external world), which can only be construed by a detached observer.16 The 
systemic relation between a living being and its “Umwelt” is analyzed by Uexküll 
as a feedback loop between perceptive and motor activities and their respective 
environmental correlates. The concept of linear causality following the model of 
the unconditioned reflex is thus replaced by the cybernetic idea of circular 
causality – Uexküll uses the term “Funktionskreis” (functional circle) – as general 
explanatory principle for the relation between life and its milieu.17 
 
Ecoystems 
Thus at the beginning of the 20th century, basic elements of a proto-cybernetic 
view of ecology as systems theory are already widely established, when the term 
“ecosystem” is introduced by Arthur George Tansley (1871-1955) in 1935.18 
Tansley develops the concept in a critical discussion of the holistic approaches of 
Clements and Phillips.19 For Tansley, an ecosystem consists of both biotic and 
non-biotic elements such as soil or water, atmosphere and climate; he therefore 
rejects the notions of complex or super-organisms with their vitalist implications, 
proposing the term “quasi-organism” instead. With respect to the ontological and 
epistemological status of ecosystems, Tansley furthermore argues that they are 
                                                 
15
 Cf. John Scott Haldane, “Life and Mechanism,” Mind, 9.33 (1884): 27–47. 
16
 Johann Jakob von Uexküll, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (Berlin: Julius Springer, 
1909), 1–10, 191–196, 248–253 et. pass. 
17
 Cf. Johann Jakob von Uexküll, Theoretische Biologie (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1928), 
ch. 5. 
18
 The term “ecosystem” was actually suggested to Tansley in the early 1930ies by Arthur 
Roy Clapham, then a young colleague of Tansley’s at Oxford; cf. A. J. Willis, “The 
Ecosystem. An Evolving Concept Viewed Historically,” Functional Ecology, 11.2 
(1997): 268–271, 268. 
19
 George Arthur Tansley, “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,” 
Ecology, 16.3 (1935): 284–307. 
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 not given or objective entities, but ‘mental isolates’.20 The identification of 
ecosystems relies on heuristic boundaries that are introduced by an observer 
rather than representing real physical closures. The first consequent application of 
the ecosystem concept is ascribed to Raymond Laurel Lindeman (1915-1942), 
who in a seminal study scrutinizes the trophic dynamics of a small lake in 
Minnesota, taking the lake as an energy system made up of living and non-living 
elements.21 Lindeman’s use of quantitative and statistical methods is inspired by 
his teacher, the noted limnologist George Evelyn Hutchinson (1903-1991). 
Hutchinson later takes part in the Macy Conferences and publishes a paper on 
“Circular Causal Systems in Ecology”.22 
Historically, the notion of ecosystem thus reflects an important shift in 
ecological thinking. The ecosystem concept made possible a reconfiguration of 
central assumptions developed in the frameworks of holism and vitalism, 
seemingly avoiding teleological and metaphysical implications while at the same 
time allowing to maintain basic explanatory principles such as the irreducibility of 
the whole to its parts or the existence of emergent properties. In terms of 
ecosystems, nature becomes an object of mathematical, technical and economic 
analysis, and ecology turns into a knowledge which is essentially concerned with 
resource management. In this form, ecosystem thinking became institutionalized 
as the most influencing branch of ecology. One of its renowned proponents is 
Eugene P. Odum, who advocates and further develops the ecosystem concept in 
his textbook Fundamentals of Ecology. First published in 1953, this book 
remained the standard work of academic teaching until the 1970s.23 The book was 
co-authored by Eugene’s brother Howard T. Odum, who also was a pioneer of 
ecosystem ecology and, like Lindeman, a disciple of Hutchinson. Mainly under 
the influence of Howard T., the Fundamentals, especially in their third edition of 
1971, make extensive use of cybernetic concepts and vocabulary such as input 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 299f. 
21
 Raymond L. Lindeman, “The Trophic-Dynamic Aspect of Ecology,” Ecology, 23.4 
(1942): 399–417; on the background of this paper and Lindeman’s work, see Robert E. 
Cook, “Raymond Lindeman and the Trophic Dynamic Concept in Ecology”, Science, 
New Series 198.4312 (1977): 22–26. 
22
 Cf. Peter J. Taylor, “Technocratic Optimism, H. T. Odum, and the Partial 
Transformation of Ecological Metaphor after World War II,“ Journal of the History of 
Biology, 21.2 (1988): 213–244, 215ff. 
23
 Eugene P. Odum and Howard T. Odum, Fundamentals of Ecology (Philadelphia: W.B. 
Saunders, 1953; 2nd ed., 1959; 3rd ed., 1971; 4th ed., 1983, 5th ed., 2005) The book 
was translated in more than thirty languages. On the reception of the Fundamentals, see 
Joel B. Hagen, “Teaching Ecology during the Environmental Age, 1965-1980,“ 
Environmental History, 13.4 (2008): 704–723. 
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 and output relations, control and feedback, organization and complexity to 
describe the flows of energy and material in natural systems.24 
Eugene P. Odum did not share his brother’s addiction to energetic 
reductionism, but he surely also was a technocratic optimist. Influenced by his 
father Howard D. Odum, a noted sociologist, and by the political visions of the 
New Deal, Eugene P. Odum understood ecology as a theory with broad 
implications, bridging between natural and social systems, and believed in the 
possibility of sustainable resource management. Accordingly, he favored such 
biological concepts as mutualism and co-operation over competition.25 
In the 1950s and 1960s, ecosystem ecology, which had so far been a rather 
technical academic subdiscipline of biology, enters into complex relations with 
environmentalism as a new form of popular and political concerns about the 
conditions of existence under global industrialization and capitalism. Ecological 
hazards caused by smog, the use of pesticides, radioactive fallout, and ecocidal 
warfare, combined with global shortages of grain and oil reserves, led to a 
growing public awareness of environmental problems.26 One of the most 
suggestive settings for the popularization of ecological consciousness was the 
planetary perspective offered by space exploration, which is reflected by 
McLuhan’s recourse to the Sputnik. In 1965, the economist Kenneth E. Boulding 
coined the metaphor of “spaceship earth” and contrasted the model of a wasteful 
“cowboy economy” with that of a sustainable “spaceman economy” aware of 
strictly limited resources and the potential finiteness of existential conditions.27 
The metaphor of spaceship earth, which replaced that of the lifeboat,28 soon 
gained popularity and was developed further by Buckminster Fuller and others. 
Photographs of the earth taken from satellites, later by Apollo astronauts, 
provided icons for environmental consciousness. The blue marble figured on the 
cover of Stewart Brand’s “Whole Earth Catalog” in 1968. Consequently, Eugene 
P. Odum’s book “Ecology and Our Endangered Life-Support Systems”, published 
                                                 
24
 Cf. Taylor, “Technocratic Optimism,” 224. On the Odum brothers and the historical 
relations between cybernetics and ecosystems thinking, see Claus Pias, “Paradiesische 
Zustände. Tümpel – Erde – Raumstation,” in Stehende Gewässer. Medien der 
Stagnation, ed. by Butis Butis (Zürich, Berlin: Diaphanes, 2007), 47–66. 
25
 On Eugene Odum’s intellectual background, see Hagen, “Teaching Ecology”, 704–
709. 
26
 Cf. Mauricio Schoijet, “Limits to Growth and the Rise of Catastrophism,” 
Environmental History, 4.4 (1999): 515–530, 517f. 
27
 Cf. W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers. How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued 
Space Colonies, Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), 23. 
28
 Cf. Hagen, “Teaching Ecology“, 709–713. 
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 in 1989, begins with a prologue on the Apollo 13 disaster as a general allegory of 
ecology. 
 
Probing the Limits 
By these discoursive transformations, ecological questions in general and the 
dominant ecosystems approach in particular become increasingly concerned with 
the problem of finiteness. When the Club of Rome set out to model the future 
dynamics of economic growth in the 1970s, the term ecology advanced to a 
universal synonym for the limitations of nature itself, abandoning the historical 
ideas of perfectibility and infinite progress as constitutive for human nature. In 
1970, the Club issued a paper entitled “The Predicament of Mankind. Quest for 
Structured Responses to Growing World-wide Complexities and Uncertainties,”29 
which aims at developing tools for analyzing the existential conditions of 
humankind on a global scale. The leading assumption is that particular problems 
such as population growth, scarcity of resources, pollution, food shortage, and 
educational deficits can no longer be treated in isolation and locally, but rather 
represent a complex setting of interacting hazards that requires a systemic 
analysis and treatment. The future of humankind is embedded into a horizon 
which the Club of Rome dubs “world problematique”. This “problematique” is 
defined by its global scale, dynamic and complex character, and especially by its 
temporal urgency. 
The paper on the ‘predicament of mankind’ laid the foundations for the 
famous report The Limits to Growth, published in 1972, which was prepared for 
the Club of Rome by a team of researchers of the Systems Dynamics Group of the 
Sloan School of Management at the MIT under the direction of Jay W. 
Forrester.30 Technically, the study is based on a model (dubbed “World3”) that 
covers important global scale anthropogenic effects in mathematical terms and 
allows to experiment with the temporal interaction of these effects by means of 
computer simulation.31 Central to this approach are cybernetic considerations 
                                                 
29
 The Club of Rome. The Predicament of Mankind. Quest for Structured Responses to 
Growing World-wide Complexities and Uncertainties. A Proposal (Genf, 1970). 
30
 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers and William W. Behrens 
III, The Limits to Growth. A Report for The Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament 
of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1972). 
31
 During the years, two updates of the Limits have been published, providing some 
revisions and changes of the simulation methods and prognoses, cf. Donella H. 
Meadows et al., Beyond the Limits (Post Mills: Chelsea Green, 1992) and Donella H. 
Meadows et al., Limits to Growth. The 30-Year Update (White River Junction: Chelsea 
Green, 2004). 
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 concerning the role of positive and negative feedback on progressive growth rates. 
Assuming that the carrying capacity of the earth is limited, exponential growth of 
parameters such as world population, fertilizer consumption, industrial capital 
savings, or pollution lead to a global “overshoot” that is predicted to cause more 
or less catastrophic changes until the world system settles to a new state of 
equilibrium.32 The report to the Club of Rome thus transports the Malthusian 
scenario of natural limits imposed on exponential population increase to the 
digital age.33 The idea of limitations to growth provides a stable frame of 
reference which remains valid for ecological thought up to the present. Recent 
approaches to the concept of global sustainability and resilience, e.g., draw on the 
concept of “planetary boundaries”, trying to define threshold values for 
parameters such as species diversity, pollution, and population, with the goal of 
“estimating a safe operating space for humanity with respect to the functioning of 
the Earth System.”34 
As a central innovation, the world model used in the Limits to Growth 
follows a logic of simulation to the effect that ecology is no longer descriptive, 
but rather construed as an operational setting that demands experimental 
interaction. Tuning parameters such as population growth or industrial capital 
rate, and observing the non-predictable outputs, is open to assume qualities of 
playful action, which explains the affinities of scientific ecological modelling to 
computer games of world simulation such as the “Daisy World” of Andrew 
Watson and James Lovelock, or “SimEarth”.35 
                                                 
32
 For critical discussion of the background and the reception of the Limits, cf. Schoijet, 
“Limits to Growth”; Francis Sandbach, “The Rise and Fall of the Limits to Growth 
Debate,” Social Studies of Science, 8.4 (1978): 495–520; Vaclav Smil, “Limits to 
Growth Revisited: A Review Essay”, Population and Development Review, 31.1 
(2005): 157–164. 
33
 In his book An Essay on the Principles of Population (London: J. Johnson, 1798), the 
English cleric and political economist Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) developed 
an influencing though controversial theory of the relation between population growth 
and limiting factors such as famine and disease. According to Malthus, population 
multiplies geometrically, while food supply increases only arithmetically, leading to 
catastrophic future scenarios. Present Neo-Malthusian approaches extend the argument 
from population growth and food shortage to other critical resources and environmental 
factors. On historical discussion and recent debates in the context of the “Limits to 
Growth”-reception, see Schoijet, “Limits to Growth”. 
34
 Cf. Johan Rockström et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space 
for Humanity,“ Ecology and Society, 14.2 (2009): 32, 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/ 
35
 One of the earliest and prototypical large-scale ecological simulation environments is 
Buckminster Fuller’s ‘World Game’ of the 1960s, cf. Christina Vagt, “Fiktion und 
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 While the Limits to Growth of 1972 are commonly supposed to have 
substantially contributed to the rise of ecological consciousness,36 they did so 
mainly by popularizing a specific scientific approach to ecological modelling, and 
by drawing on a specific technical medium, the computer. The normative impact 
of the “Limits” does not aim at a cautious treatment of nature, but rather serves to 
promote the ideas of technical and social engineering.37 Which leads to the master 
mind of the project. Jay Wright Forrester, electrical engineer and systems 
researcher, started his career at MIT during World War II with the development of 
servomechanisms for radar antennas and gun mounts. At the end of the war, 
Forrester directed the development of an aircraft flight simulator. The work on 
this project stimulated the design of the first digital computer, the Whirlwind 
system, which laid ground for experimental research on military combat 
information systems that resulted in the renowned SAGE (Semi-Automatic 
Ground Environment) air defence system for North America.38 
In the 1950s, Forrester turned from military environments to economic 
management and in this context developed his theory of Dynamic Systems, which 
is concerned with modelling and simulating complex systems that exhibit a non-
linear behavior. In the following years, Forrester applied his theory on different 
scales, publishing books on “Industrial Dynamics” (1961), followed by the 
broader socio-political context of “Urban Dynamics” (1969), and finally by the 
global context of “World Dynamics” (1971). In the latter book, Forrester outlines 
the computer model that underlies the World3 simulation of the “Limits to 
Growth”, which was published nine months later. Supported by the seeming 
authority of the most advanced and promising technology, computer modelling 
here gains the status of a universal tool of scientific explanation as well as 
practical management, irrespective of the domain or scale of application. 
In retrospect, ecological systems thinking presents itself as a field where 
the technical figuration of life and of nature becomes inseparable from the 
naturalization and animation of technology. This reversibility, which is 
characteristic already for the parallel conception of machines and human 
                                                                                                                                     
Simulation. Buckminster Fullers World Game,” Archiv für Mediengeschichte, 13 
(2013): 117–145. 
36
 In fact, the appearance of the report was well planned and announced in ways which 
would trigger public interest in advance, cf. Sandbach, “The Rise and Fall of the Limits 
to Growth Debate.” 
37
 This also applies to earlier cybernetically inspired systems ecology, cf. Taylor, 
“Technocratic Optimism”. 
38
 Cf. Forrester’s autobiographical description, Jay W. Forrester, The Beginning of System 
Dynamics. Banquet Talk at the International Meeting of the System Dynamics Society 
Stuttgart, Germany July 13, l989. 
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 (working) bodies in the industrial age, is even more characteristic for the 
information age, where computer programming, modelling, and simulation 
become dominant techniques of knowledge as well as biopolitic practice, both on 
the macroscopic level of ecology (‘world dynamics’) and on the microscopic level 
of organisms, finally on the molecular basis of ‘life itself’. 
 
From Ecological Systems to the Transformation of ‘Life’ 
One of the most prominent examples for the modelling and simulation of features 
of ‘life’ on a micro-level is the algorithmic artefact ‘Game of Life’. The media 
history of ‘Game of Life’ (in the following abbreviated ‘Life’) also brings forward 
how the rise of ‘games’ as part of computer culture since the early 1970s is 
interconnected with the popularization of systems thinking. 
‘Life’ is commonly understood as a game that provides an example of 
emergence and self-organization, therefore supporting concepts like ‘autopoiesis’ 
and ‘emergence’ that were brought into debate from thinkers of the second wave 
of cybernetics.39 It is also known to be the most popular version of a cellular 
automaton. It was first presented in Martin Gardner’s popular column in Scientific 
American in October 1970. The basic algorithm was developed by British 
mathematician John Horton Conway between 1968 and 1970. The original game 
is played on a 2-dimensional grid, similar to a checkerboard that is populated with 
so called ‘cells’. The development of any ‘Life’ pattern is determined by 
Conway’s “genetic laws” for births, deaths, and survivals of the cell population. 
The rules of the game are quite simple, and its very simplicity is part of its 
success. Gardner listed the complete rules in his article from 1970: 
1. Survivals. Every counter with two or three neighboring counters 
survives for the next generation. 
2. Deaths. Each counter with four or more neighbors dies (is 
removed) from overpopulation. Every counter with one neighbor 
or none dies from isolation. 
3. Births. Each empty cell adjacent to exactly three neighbors--no 
more, no fewer--is a birth cell. A counter is placed on it at the next 
move.40 
                                                 
39
 Cf. B. Clarke and M. B. N. Hansen, “Neocybernetic Emergence: Retuning the 
Posthuman,” Cybernetics and Human Knowing, no. 16 (2009): 83–99. 
40
 M. Gardner, “Mathematical Games – The Fantastic Combinations of John Conway’s 
New Solitaire Game ‘Life,’” Scientific American, no. 223 (October 1970): 120–23, 
120. 
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 By repeated application of the rules to the subsequent generations of cells, 
different patterns occur on the checkerboard. Because of the way patterns seem to 
evolve to ‘life-like’ behavior the game was often described as ‘fascinating’ and 
‘surprising’. 
While it could be argued that computer games in general are an offspring 
of cybernetics and therefore means of the proliferation of cybernetic systems 
thinking, this certainly fits as a description of ‘Game of Life’.41 When ‘Life’ 
became more and more popular during the 1970s, it attracted significant interest 
in different scientific disciplines, like computer science, economics, mathematics, 
philosophy, physics and biology. Since ‘Life’ started just in time with the growing 
distribution of a new generation of minicomputers it also became a part of the 
hobbyist computer culture. The influential American microcomputer magazine 
BYTE discussed ‘Life’ prominently already in its first issue in 1975, and editor 
Carl Helmer dedicated an ongoing column called LIFE-line to the game. A later 
issue (1978/3/12) gave detailed instructions for “Life with your computer” and 
encouraged its readers to develop their own version of ‘Life’. 
Until today, the computer is the essential medium of ‘Life’ and the game 
is used to teach programming skills as well as to study pattern generating 
algorithms and ‘emergent behavior’. It remarkably crosses and interconnects 
scientific research with hobbyist computer culture, computer science with 
biology, cybernetic ideas with simulation techniques. Within various scientific 
disciplines it supports the transformation of epistemic practices that combine 
aspects of ‘playful experimentation’, simulation techniques and computer 
programming. A contemporary example for this function of the game can be 
found in the price awarded scholarly book “Self-Organization in Biological 
Systems“, published in 2003 in the series Princeton Studies in Complexity and 
edited by Scott Camazine. In this book, ‘Life’ is used as an example for 
complexity and self-organiziation and at the same time as a software-tool to teach 
simulation techniques. Interestingly, the authors feel obliged to clarify that ‘Game 
                                                 
41
 While games where already present in early cybernetic theory, with prominent 
examples like von Neumann’s interest in the mathematical theory of games as a 
possible application to economic theory, Turing’s references to chess as a testing 
ground for advances in artificial intelligence or Shannon’s obsession with all kinds of 
playful machines, it is not until the 1970s that computer-based games found their way 
to popular culture. For a more detailed discussion of the relevance of games in early 
computer discourse cf. Serjoscha Wiemer, “Strategiespiele und das Medium-Werden 
des Computers. Computerschach als Faktor der Rekonzeptionalisierung des Computers 
als programmierbare Maschine zwischen 1945 und 1960“, in Diskurse des 
strategischen Spiels. Medialität, Gouvernementalität, Topografie, ed. by Rolf F. Nohr, 
Serjoscha Wiemer, and Stefan Böhme (Münster: LIT, 2014), 83–112. 
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 of Life’ “is merely a stylized model of the dynamic evolution of a population of 
organisms and without real biological relevance“. Nevertheless it is repeatedly 
used as a point of reference, because “its simplicity makes it a good didactic 
example.”42 ‘Life’ can be found in a list of programs for the simulation software 
StarLogo, together with simulations of pattern formation in slime molds, 
synchronized flashing among fireflies or colony thermoregulation in honey bees.  
Within the broader field of digital culture, ‘Life’ is part of the distribution 
of programming skills in conjunction with ideas of self-organization and 
emergence as well as with ‘entertainment’ in the sense of fun and playful practice. 
It is a striking example of a decentered distribution of knowledge and its 
(re)production by algorithmic media.43 Algorithmic media like ‘Life’ can be seen 
as elements of todays ‘nature-database’, re-codifying concepts of nature and 
information.44 
 
Ludic Function as Interdiscourse and Naturalization 
The broad application of ‘Life’ from scientific research to entertainment can be 
understood with regard to its specific features as a game. To further explore this 
                                                 
42
 See Scott Camazine, Self-Organization in Biological Systems (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 81. 
43
 Within the field of cultural and media studies scholars like Laura Marks, Alexander 
Galloway, and Jussi Parikka among others have contributed to a theoretical 
understanding of “algorithmic media”, but the concepts are still in a flux. One common 
aspect could be seen in the drive towards a neo-materialistic understanding of 
algorithmic media that tries to overcome a traditionally staged “opposition between 
mechanistic and vitalist understandings of (dead versus lively) matter”. Cf. Diana H. 
Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics 
(Durham [NC]; London: Duke University Press, 2010), 11. For the approaches of 
Marks and Galloway cf. Laura U. Marks, „Thinking like a carpet: embodied perception 
and individuation in algorithmic media“, in Ent-Automatisierung, ed. by Annette 
Brauerhoch and Anke Zechner (Paderborn: Fink, 2014); Alexander R. Galloway, 
Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 
2006). 
44
 Referring to concepts of new materialism, German Duarte proposed the term ‘nature-
database’ to describe the new relation between materiality and information that evolves 
from the intensified interrelation of ‘nature’ and ‘technology’. As Duarte states 
“nature-database can be understood as a new codification of ‘reality’ from which non-
fix meaning derives and in which biological (material) and non-biological (technology 
and information) coexist and are in constant transformation.” German Duarte, “New-
Materialism and Reification in the Infoproduction Era,” Communication +1, no. 2 
(September 8, 2013), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cpo/vol2/iss1/4. 
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 idea we will draw on Rolf F. Nohrs concept of the “naturalization” of knowledge 
and Gerald Voorhees’ concept of computer games as “game of truth”.45 German 
media scholar Rolf Nohr discusses the function of games within a general 
framework of the discoursive circulation of knowledge.46 According to Nohr, a 
characteristic discoursive function of computer games is that of “naturalization” 
which is realized by “translating” elements of special discoursive knowledge to 
the level of the common sense.47 A key attribute of this theory is the importance 
of the ludic function of games as a performative process and how a general idea is 
transferred to the level of individual perception and belief. By playing a game one 
activates its aesthetic dimension not as an abstract, but as an individual, temporal 
experience, where a game unfolds as something that is more or less defined in 
relation to one’s active involvement and configurative actions.48 In other words: 
to play a game is the subjective instantiation of an abstract form as a sensual 
experience and therefore coupled with the temporality of perception and 
subjectivity. According to Nohr, this “sensualization” should be interpreted as an 
element of “naturalization”, which leads to the translation of special discourse 
knowledge to common sense. Therefore computer games realize a “procedure of 
integration” which is part of their function as “interdiscourses”.49 While Nohr 
points to the function of games for the transfer of knowledge, this idea can be 
complemented by Gerald Voorhees’ concept of the epistemological function of 
games.50 Adopting the term ‘game of truth’ from Foucauldian discourse analysis 
and applying it to the study of computer games, Voorhees points to the 
epistemological relevance of games: “digital games model the discursive 
formations that give shape to what is reasonable, what is possible and what is 
                                                 
45
 Gerald Voorhees, “Discursive Games and Gamic Discourses,” Communication +1, 
no. 1, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cpo/vol1/iss1/3. 
46
 Rolf F. Nohr, “The Naturalization of Knowledge. Games Between Common Sense and 
Specialized Knowledge,” in Logic and Structure of the Computer Game, ed. Michael 
Liebe, Dieter Mersch, and Stephan Günzel, vol. 4, DIGAREC Series (Potsdam: 
University Press, 2010), 130–43. 
47
 With reference to Jürgen Link’s theory of ‘critical discourse analysis’, Nohr 
distinguishes between ‘special discourses’ of highly specialized knowledge, for 
example in scientific discourses of economics, biology, mathematics etc., and a level of 
‘shared’ or ‘common’ knowledge being part of the everyday of a given society (for 
Link’s theory cf. Siegfried Jäger, Kritische Diskursanalyse: Eine Einführung, 6th ed., 
Edition DISS 3 (Münster: Unrast, 2004)). 
48
 Markku Eskelinen, “The Gaming Situation,” Game Studies. The International Journal 
of Computer Game Research. 1, no. 1 (July 2001), 
http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/eskelinen. 
49
 Nohr, “The Naturalization”, 137. 
50
 Gerald Voorhees, “Discursive Games”.  
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 foreclosed in a given historical moment, enabling critical scholars of 
communication to better conceptualize the operation of power.”51  
 
Game of Truth: Cybernetic’s Concept of Self-Reproduction and the 
Invention of Cellular Automata 
Following Voorhees’ suggestion to ask about the “given historical moment” when 
‘Game of Life’ came into existence, it is not sufficient just to name the 
publication of the rules and descriptions in Martin Gardner’s column on 
recreational mathematics in Scientific American in October 1970. Understood as 
an expression of a certain “epistemological force”52, one has to take the 
conceptual foundation of ‘Life’ as an example of cellular automata more 
serious.53 This leads to the epistemological presuppositions of ‘Life’ and to the 
question how Conway’s rules of the game refer to the historical epistemology of 
cybernetics. Media scholar Jussi Parrika identified Conway’s work as part of an 
epistemological idea “to see nature as a computational process” and, in particular, 
“as part of the history of mathematical organisms and simulations”. 54 When 
Parikka discussed ‘Game of Life’ in “Digital Contagions”, his seminal study of 
computer viruses, he pointed to the “key role” of self-reproduction and to the fact 
that with cellular automata, the concept of self-reproduction was combined with 
“principles of universal computation”.55 The crucial point is that ‘Life’ is a 
leading example of the idea of the computability of nature by the means of 
systems theory. 
                                                 
51
 Ibid., 16. 
52
 Voorhees, “Discursive Games”, 13. 
53
 Since ‘Game of Life’ itself refers to the notion of ‘life’, it is of great importance to 
reconstruct the concept of life that leads to the possibility of ‘Game of Life’ and to be 
sensitive to the historical movement that ‘Life’ is involved in, how it is enmeshed in 
the struggle of the reconceptualization of life as ‘information’. To look at ‘Game of 
Life’ as a ‘game of truth’ in this sense might imply to try to reconstruct the ‘discoursive 
formation’ that gave shape to the game. Including questions like “What are the 
necessary conditions to make the formation of this specific game possible?”, “What are 
the epistemological articulations and the power relations, that are specific to the game 
in a given historical moment?”, “What were the epistemological concepts that could 
lead to the formulation of cellular automata?”, “What was their theoretical function 
within the ‘game of truth’ that cybernetics played in the 1940s and 1950s?”, “What was 
their ‘strategic’ value?”, “What were the questions and theoretical problems that lead to 
the concept of cellular automata?”. 
54
 Jussi Parikka, Digital Contagions: A Media Archaeology of Computer Worms and 
Viruses (New York [u.a.]: Peter Lang, 2007), 232f. 
55
 Ibid. 
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 The basic idea of cellular automata was formulated by John von Neumann 
in the 1940s.56 Von Neumann’s first approach to a theory of self-reproducing 
automata was about an automaton that could materially reproduce itself.57 In 
addition to this concept of a “Universal Constructing Machine” (also called 
“kinematic model”) he later developed a second model of self-reproducing 
automata, which does not pose the mechanical and material problems of the first 
and which became known as the theory of cellular automata: In this approach, the 
automata are based on a two-dimensional array of elementary “cells.”58 This 
concept finally led to the invention of ‘Game of Life’ by Conway. 
It is remarkable that von Neumann developed his initial idea of automata 
as self-reproducing structures when he tried to find a mathematical description of 
complexity. Self-reproduction and the theory of biological evolution served as a 
key to von Neumann’s understanding of the meaning of ‘complexity’. He argued 
that while natural organisms would show the ability for increasing complexity, 
which would be the case with “long periods of evolution”, the artificial automata 
would suffer from a “degenerating tendency” and a “decrease of complexity”.59 
                                                 
56
 Claude Shannon summoned von Neumann’s ideas in 1953. The following paragraphs 
are based on his subsumption of von Neumann’s approach. Cf. Claude E. Shannon, 
“Computers and Automata,” Proceedings of the IRE 41, no. 10 (1953): 1234–41, 1240. 
57
 Von Neumann thought that, analogous to Turing’s universal computing machine, it 
could be possible to “design a kind of universal construction machine […] The 
universal constructing machine can be fed a sequence of instructions, similar to the 
program of a digital computer, which describe in a suitable code how to construct any 
other machine that can be built with the elementary components. The universal 
constructing machine will then proceed to hunt for the needed components in its 
environment and build the machine described on its tape.“ Ibid., 1240. 
58
 Claude Shannon gave a short and very precise description of the general mechanism of 
von Neumann’s initial conception of cellular automata: “Each cell is of relatively 
simple internal structure, having, in fact, something like thirty possible internal states, 
and each cell communicates directly only with its four neighbors. The state of a cell at 
the next (quantized) step in time depends only on the current state of the cell and the 
states of its four neighbors. By a suitable choice of these state transitions it is possible 
to set up a system yielding a kind of self-reproducing structure.” Ibid. 
59
 “Organisms are indirectly derived from others which had lower complexity“, but “a 
certain degenerating tendency must be expected, some decrease in complexity as one 
automaton makes another automaton.” See John von Neumann, “The General and 
Logical Theory of Automata,” in Collected works, ed. Abraham Haskel Taub, vol. V 
(Oxford; New York [etc.]: Pergamon, 1976), 288–326, 312. This statement is logical, if 
one assumes that in order for an automaton A to produce another automaton B it must 
have contained a complete description of B together with some instructions how to 
build it and therefore A must have a higher degree of “complication” than B. (ibid., 
312). After von Neumann sketched the logical and mathematical description of an 
Neubert and Wiemer / Rewriting the Matrix of Life
communication+1 Vol. 3 [2014], Iss. 1, Article 6
17
 Looking at how von Neumann presents his argument in “The General and 
Logical Theory of Automata”, one recognizes that at the beginning he is very 
strict and careful to develop his theoretical comparison of ‘natural organism’ and 
artificial automata only as means of interpretation for certain problems regarding 
the understanding of complexity. But later that relation is reversed when he takes 
the self-reproduction of automata as a model for the explanation of the self-
reproduction of genes and the production of enzymes.60 It is precisely at this point 
that an epistemological operation becomes functional, which Lily E. Kay 
analyzed as “cyborg dialectic”. Cyborg dialectic points to a procedure where 
machines and organisms are taken as a model to mutual explain the other and at 
the same time narrowing both concepts, so that their distinction becomes more 
and more blurred. According to Kay this specific cross-identity-conceptualization 
of machines and biological systems is one of the characteristics of the first wave 
of cybernetics.61 As Kay has shown in her writings about the history of science, 
this cyborg dialectic can be found explicitly in the formation of the concepts of 
the ‘genetic code’ and the reconceptualization of ‘life’ in modern molecular 
biology. Within the ontological framework of cybernetics, ‘life’ was not only 
regulated by cybernetic mechanisms of feedback and homeostasis, but it finally 
became thinkable to understand ‘life itself’ as pure ‘information’.  
Thus, at the time when British mathematician John Horton Conway started 
his work on ‘Game of Life’ around 1968, he entered an already established array 
of mutual conceptualizations of ‘living organisms’ and ‘artificial automata’. At 
the end of the 1960s the idea of taking self-reproducing automata as a model for 
the understanding and ‘calculation’ of biological processes of cellular 
                                                                                                                                     
automaton with the ability of self-reproduction that could possibly be a solution to the 
degenerating tendency, he proposed a direct comparison of the process of self-
reproducing automata and living organisms, declaring “the copying mechanism B 
performs the fundamental act of reproduction, the duplication of the genetic material, 
which is clearly the fundamental operation in the multiplication of living cells.” (ibid., 
317). 
60
 Ibid., 318. 
61
 The concept of cyborg dialectic is developed as part of Kay’s analysis of the 
epistemological shift of neuroscience in the theoretical works of Warren S. McCulloch 
and Walter Pitts that played a crucial role in the ‘cognitive turn’ of the 1950s: 
“McCulloch-Pitts neural nets and Turing’s machine became the twin pillars of early 
automata studies and computer design [...]. And just as with Wiener’s cybernetics, in 
which the nervous system became a model for negative feedback machines and, in turn, 
the machine a model for biological systems, this cyborg dialectic obtained also in 
logical automata.” Lily E. Kay, “From Logical Neurons to Poetic Embodiments of 
Mind: Warren S. McCulloch’s Project in Neuroscience,” Science in Context 14, no. 04 
(2001): 591–614, 602. 
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 reproduction on a molecular level was already in circulation.62 Some of these 
conceptions privileged the phenomenon of ‘self-reproduction’ as paradigmatic 
feature of ‘life’, while others were more structured by concepts of information, 
program, feedback or complexity.  
 
Artificial Life 
While ‘Game of Life’, until today, is used for modeling ‘natural’ and ‘lifelike’ 
processes and as algorithmic medium for theoretical research across a broad range 
of disciplines,63 a very distinct and specific role of ‘Life’ can be found within 
artificial life research. Christopher Langton, one of the founding figures of 
artificial life (also abbreviated A-Life) as an academic field of study, proposed to 
acknowledge non-organic entities as ‘alive’ and proclaimed cellular automata as 
preferred research tool.64 The ‘lifelike’ behavior of Conway’s ‘Life’ is a much 
used ‘visual’ argument for this approach.65 It seems plausible that much of the 
game’s continuous attraction is related to its visual attributes, how it “offers direct 
                                                 
62
 As Evelyn Fox Keller has shown, ‘program’ and ‘computer’ became influential as 
metaphors for the understanding of biological development during the 1960s, namely 
with regard to genetic research and molecular biology. Cf. Evelyn Fox Keller, “Beyond 
the Gene but beneath the Skin,” in Arguing about Science, ed. Alexander Bird and 
James Ladyman (New York: Routledge, 2012), 125–39, 129f. Stahl is one of the early 
researchers who also referred directly to the idea of self-replicating machines as 
theorized by von Neumann; Apter (1966) emphasized the importance of logical or 
computer models of genetic control and differentiation mechanisms, after François 
Jacob and Jacques Monod, who had applied cybernetic concepts of ‘regulation’ and 
‘control’ successfully to the description of biochemical mechanisms of enzyme 
synthesis, were awarded with the Nobel Price in Medicine in 1965 (together with 
André Lwoff). Cf. Walter R. Stahl, “A Computer Model of Cellular Self-
Reproduction,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 14, no. 2 (1967): 187–205; Michael 
John Apter, Cybernetics and Development, International Series of Monographs in Pure 
and Applied Biology. Div.: Zoology; 29 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966). 
63
 An ongoing interest in ‘Game of Life’ can be observed in mathematics, physics, 
biology, chemistry, music theory, simulation theory, and other disciplines. A collection 
of different approaches, with a certain emphasis on mathematics, can be found in 
Andrew Adamatzky, ed., Game of Life Cellular Automata (London; New York: 
Springer, 2010). 
64
 Christopher G. Langton, “Studying Artificial Life with Cellular Automata,” Physica D: 
Nonlinear Phenomena, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual International Conference, 22, 
no. 1–3 (October 1986): 120–49. 
65
 The reference of A-Life to ‚Life‘ has been discussed in more detail in Sherry Turkle, 
Life on the Screen (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
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 visual evidence of how simple rules can generate complex patterns”.66 In this 
regard, it is possible to identify at least two different aspects of the visual qualities 
of ‘Life’: a) the aesthetic experience of movement or animation and b) the 
pleasing unpredictability of pattern development with a rich diversity of 
reoccurring ‘organisms’ (specimens) and designs in constant flux. 
While the geometrical and topological features of ‘Life’ may be regarded 
as a direct outcome of its specific mathematical foundation, this does not hold true 
for its visual aspects, since the visibility and its perceivability as well as 
perceptibility in general is not only an outcome of its mathematical structure but 
also very much of its materialized processing by computer media and the related 
graphical displays. This is an important aspect that exemplifies how algorithmic 
media are relying on material processes, where ‘matter’ and ‘information’ are not 
opposed but entangled. If ‘Life’ can be regarded a significant historical landmark 
concerning the rewriting of the matrix of life, it is because its main feature is not 
on the level of the ‘symbolic’ or in the register of ‘representation’, but how it 
brings together concepts, code, algorithm, material calculation, and perception in 
a dense process of mediation. At least from the perspective of new materialisms 
or materialist media theory67 it would be wrong to treat ‘Life’ as an example of 
the ‘immaterial’ essence of ‘life itself’ – since the very mechanism of computer 
technology is the specific arrangement of ‘matter’ for the purpose of calculation. 
Computers are essentially material devices, as media scholars have often 
emphasized.68 One of their material features is the ability to display structures of 
information and rule based processes. 
 
To See It is to Know It - Aesthetic-Epistemological Power 
Regarding the importance of computers as visual media, Sherry Turkle’s 
description of her first encounter with ‘Life’ is an instructive example of how the 
                                                 
66
 John Johnston, The Allure of Machinic Life: Cybernetics, Artificial Life, and the New 
AI (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), 10. 
67
 According to Milla Tiainen and Jussi Parikka, the new materialist approach can be 
characterized by a “commitment to developing models of immanent and continuously 
emergent relationality” as well as by a certain materialist understanding of media as a 
“network of concrete, material, physical and physiological apparatuses and their 
interconnections”. See Jussi Parikka and Milla Tiainen, “What Is New Materialism-
Opening Words from the Event,” accessed April 1, 2014, 
http://machinology.blogspot.de/2010/06/what-is-new-materialism-opening-words.html. 
68
 For example Frank Hartmann, Mediologie: Ansätze einer Medientheorie der 
Kulturwissenschaften (Wien: Facultas Universitätsverlag, 2003), 11. Hartmann points 
to the fact that „digital“ in the realm of the computer means that binary arithmetic is 
switched electronically, which implies electronic engineering and material processes. 
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 aesthetic function of computer mediated mathematical processes structures and 
rules the perception of a game’s ‘epistemological’ message. In Life on the screen 
Turkle recalls how ‘Life’ began to challenge the way she thought about ‘life 
itself’: 
When I first came upon it, the Game of Life was running on a 
small, unattended screen. Things came together and flew apart, 
shapes emerged, receded, and reemerged. I remember thinking 
about fire and water. The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard 
had written about the universal fascination of watching fire, which, 
like watching moving water, is something that people seem drawn 
to across all times and cultures. There is repetition and sameness, 
surprise and pattern. Fire and water evoke eternal patterns of life, 
and now, so could a computer screen. In 1977, I stood alone at the 
screen, watched the Game of Life, and felt like a little girl at the 
oceans’ edge. At the same time I assumed that all life had to be 
carbon based. […] But as I came to understand how he Game of 
Life could be reset to generate complexity from initial randomness, 
it took on another level of fascination. I saw how this evolving, 
unfolding visual display might challenge my simple 
preconceptions. Perhaps something about life could be understood 
in terms of these evolving forms. I was intrigued by the idea but 
resisted it.69  
From a perspective of media theory, Turkle’s fascination with the visual 
movements, reminding her of “eternal patterns of life” by resembling the 
experience of watching fire and water, should not be understood as the analogue 
to a “universal fascination” that is essential the same “across all times and 
cultures”. Rather it should be understood as an effect of ‘animation’ specifically 
related to the medium of the computer. It is precisely the visual display that is in 
the center of Turkle being “intrigued by the idea” of life as formations of evolving 
patterns and informational description of complexity. However, Turkle’s dense 
rhetorical scene is not only instructive regarding the rhetorical potential of the 
game to translate visual qualities into intriguing ideas, but also regarding the 
reference to eternity, fire and water. As physical phenomena fire and water do not 
fall into the realm of common ontologies of ‘life’ or ‘living organisms’. And more 
so, “life” is commonly understood as limited, since mortality is one of the 
essential properties of “life”, which is very much in contrast to Turkle’s 
awestruck invocation of “eternal patterns”. 
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 In fact, Turkle’s description seems to be closer to a familiar cultural 
concept of ‘nature’ than of ‘life’. This might become even more obvious 
regarding the overlap between Turkle’s affirmation of ‘(L)life’ and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s description of “play” which he developed in his theory about the 
artwork: Gadamer’s ideas about ‘play’ are directed against any individual or 
‘subjective’ aspects of games, trying to reflect on ‘play as such’, apart from 
personal experience or idealistic tradition. “Play” is described in direct 
correspondence to “the mobile form of nature”.70 For Gadamer, nature itself is 
understood as a play – without the necessity of human subjects involved:  
If we examine how the word ‘play’ is used and concentrate on its 
so-called metaphorical senses, we find talk of the play of light, the 
play of the waves, the play of gears or parts of machinery, the 
interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, even a play 
on words. In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement 
that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end. 
Correlatively, the word ‘Spiel’ originally meant ‘dance’, and is still 
found in many word forms (e.g., in Spielmann, jongleur).71 
In a manner that could be evocative of aspects of ‘Life’, Gadamer further explains 
his idea about “play as such”: 
The movement of playing has no goal that brings it to an end; 
rather, it renews itself in constant repetition. The movement 
backward and forward is obviously so central to the definition of 
play that it makes no difference who or what performs this 
movement. The movement of play as such has, as it were, no 
substrate. It is the game that is played—it is irrelevant whether or 
not there is a subject who plays it. The play is the occurrence of the 
movement as such.72  
Gadamer’s philosophy of play can help to explain how Turkle’s fascination with 
‘Life’ transcended into a fascination of ‘nature’. The similarities between 
Gadamer’s approach to play and Turkle’s narration of her impressions of ‘Life’ 
seem to culminate in the affirmation of certain aesthetic qualities of movement. 
The patterns of ‘Game of Life’ can be attributed the quality of ‘dancing’ light, 
visible on a computer screen. In Turkle’s description, ‘Life’ resembles “the 
mobile form of nature” that Gadamer calls ‘play’. 
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 However, Turkle’s contribution to the discourse of ‘Life’ is more or less a 
byproduct of her interest in the scientific project of artificial life (A-Life). 
Christopher Langton, one of the prominent advocates of A-Life, follows the credo 
that “the ‘molecular logic’ of life can be embedded within cellular automata”.73 
As Langton states, the principle assumption made in A-Life-research is that “the 
‘logical form’ of an organism can be separated from its material basis of 
construction, and that ‘aliveness’ will be found to be a property of the former, not 
of the latter”.74 For Langton, of course, this logical form is equivalent to an 
algorithm, and therefore the “ideal tool” for the study of life is exactly the 
computer.75 Following the ideas of a bottom-up approach, where “emergent 
behavior” is thought of as an outcome of the dynamic interaction of rather simple 
“low-level primitives”,76 A-Life discourse takes ‘Life’ as an essential reference. 
Because it is not just a metaphor, but an ‘algorithmic machine’, it implies the 
promise to bridge the gap between biological studies on complexity and self-
organization in natural organisms or “biological systems”77 and the computer 
based understanding of life as complex systems of information processing.  
As the example of ‘Life’ shows, there is an ongoing translation between 
epistemological and aesthetic reasoning, where the rhetorical function depends 
very much on the specific mediality of games. While on the one hand, ‘Life’ may 
be used as an example for the conceptual shift from a notion of ‘life’ as carbon 
based to the idea that “’information’ can be ‘life’”78, on the other hand it can point 
to the importance of aesthetic qualities as fundamental aspects of the notion of 
‘life’ or ‘nature’. From a perspective of media theory, it is important to notice the 
fact that the game’s ‘meaning’ is not only determined by its context and its 
rhetorical instrumentalization for different strategic goals within the ‘game of 
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 truth’, but that the meaning-making properties have slid to the process of 
translation or mediation between ‘information’ and perception. 
 
Final Prospect  
Ongoing debates about biomedia show the traces of systems thinking on several 
levels. Remarkably, it is not only the historic relevance of systems theory’s 
epistemological project that irradiates contemporary ontologies, but also a strong 
drive to use simulations and games as means of popularization. The world models 
of system ecology and the games of ‘lifelike’ patterns both underline the 
relevance of algorithmic media as part of the production and interpretation of (our 
shared) reality. While the genealogy of systems thinking can be traced back to the 
emerging ecological thought of the late 19th century, it is the technoscientific 
approach of simulation that re-folds biology, ecology and systems thinking onto 
another. Finally, the afterlife of systems thinking becomes more or less 
undistinguishable from the afterlife of ‘nature’. Does this mean that world 
modelling should be identified as the historical vanishing point of ‘nature’, since 
system-ecological thinking is incapable of rendering anything outside as relevant 
counterpart? Or how might one think any ‘outside’ of the ecological paradigm? 
The debates between poststructuralism, systems theory and actor-network-theory 
are haunted by the ghost of nature. A zombielike afterlife: It seems likely that 
system-ecology aka “undead nature” keeps revisiting contemporary theory. 
Following an argument of gender-and-media scholar Marie-Luise 
Angerer, algorithmic media might circumscribe a new kind of mediatechnological 
state, where the ‘interval of perception’ is ‘played’ in a way that technology and 
life become “soldered” („verlötet”) in accordance to the conditions of electronic 
affective temporality. This could lead, as Angerer argues, to a point where 
technology and life, the social and the somatic, loose their mutual 
differentiation.79 
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This idea of a biomedial threshold („biomedialer Schwelle”) is based on Angerer’s 
reading of George Canguilhem’s philosophy of technology. Canguilhem developed his 
philosophy of technology in distancing himself from the cybernetic “pursue of 
hegemony” (ibid., 209). Angerer follows Canguilhem’s proposal to understand 
technology as “universal biological phenomenon” (ibid., 208), as Canguilhem argued 
in his essay Machine and Organism. Unlike in cybernetics, for Canguilhem technology 
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 Referring to Foucault’s concept of the productivity of power, Richard 
Doyle describes algorithmic media as elements of the “practice and tactics (what 
Foucault has dubbed a ‘technological ensemble’)” that are involved in the game 
of truth where “life gets networked, located, and articulated through a computer 
screen”.80 In addition to the onto-aesthetical, epistemological, and rhetorical 
functionality of algorithmic media, Alexander Galloway theorized their allegoric 
power. He states that “to interpret a game means to interpret its algorithm (to 
discover its parallel ‘allegorithm’)”81, but the playful actions that are necessary to 
discover a game’s possible worldings are not acts of hermeneutic exegesis and 
interpretation, but can be called ‘playacts’. Within algorithmic media, the 
allegorical dimensions of a game are less on the level of representations but 
communicate as playful actions: playacts refer to this situation of algorithmic 
media, where we “do” allegory, rather than comment and reflect on it. 
As part of the new compositions of the techno-biological and the techno-
ecological situation of the 21st century, the example of ‘Life’ can help to avoid 
some of the epistemological pitfalls and misconceptions that arise with the 
ideology of simulation and the afterlife of systems theory in ecological modeling 
of ‘Gaia’ and synthetic biology. ‘Life’ should remind us of the allegorical 
qualities of algorithmic media, where the game of truth has not been played 
through, but still requires ongoing playacts. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
technology that is brought in opposition to life and is used as a model to gain control 
and power over the living would then be an anthropocentric illusion. For Canguilhem’s 
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